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The Fundamental Principle of Equal State Sovereignty:  The Boundaries of the 




 Glenn Kunkes’s bold statement that “The Times, They are a Changing”1 at least partially 
predicted the result in Shelby County v. Holder last term:  the Court declared the coverage 
formula of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 unconstitutional.2  The Court’s reliance on the 
“‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the States”3 surprised even influential 
jurists.4  Even Justice Ginsburg warned, in dissent, that the Shelby County majority 
misinterpreted the principle and improperly expanded it beyond its traditional domain.5  The 
controversial decision left open critical questions about the continuing constitutionality of the 
Voting Rights Act,6 including which level of scrutiny courts should apply when reviewing 
federal laws that invade traditional areas of state sovereignty.7   
 The Court’s renewed deference to the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty 
corresponds with its decreased deference towards congressional policy-making pursuant to the 
                                                 
*J.D. Candidate, 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.A. 2012, B.A. 2011, Saint John’s University.  The 
author would like to thank Kelly Anderson, Professor Ronald Riccio, and John Wintermute for their aid and 
attention.  I acknowledge that all opinions and views are my own, and more importantly all mistakes are my 
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1 Glenn Kunkes, Note, The Times, They Are Changing: The VRA Is No Longer Constitutional, 27 J.L. & POL. 357 
(2012). 
2 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
3 Id. at 2623–24 (citing Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)). 
4 Richard A. Posner, Supreme Court 2013: The Year in Review, SLATE (June 26, 2013, 12:16 A.M.), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2013/supreme_court_2013/the_supre
me_court_and_the_voting_rights_act_striking_down_the_law_is_all.html (“This is a principle of constitutional law 
of which I have never heard.”).  
5 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
6 See, e.g., id. at 2632 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I] would find [the preclearance requirement] unconstitutional.”).  
7 Sudeep Paul, The Voting Rights Act's Fight to Stay Rational: Shelby County. v. Holder, 8 DUKE J. CONST . L. & 
PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 271, 282 (2013). 
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Fifteenth Amendment’s enforcement provision.8  The Court signaled a change in the standard of 
review in 2009 when it stated that “a departure from the fundamental principle of equal 
sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently 
related to the problem that it targets” in Northwest Austin v. Holder.9  In light of the Court’s 
decision in Shelby County, the analytical framework in Northwest Austin now applies to 
congressional statutes that treat states disparately.10  The new framework’s reduced judicial 
deference towards congressional findings and its increased scrutiny of federal statutes’ disparate 
treatment of states indicates a fundamental shift from South Carolina v. Katzenbach and its 
progeny.11   
 While some suggest that the Shelby County clarified the Court’s standard of review for all 
exercises of enumerated congressional powers in the Constitution—not rational basis but the test 
in McCulloch v. Maryland12—this Comment suggests that the Court’s standard of review will be 
different after Shelby County.  The Shelby County standard for determining the constitutionality 
of departures from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty13 is similar to the test 
employed in McCulloch, which the Court employed in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.14  Courts 
will use the Shelby County standard to evaluate the constitutionality of congressional disparate 
treatment of states, and not any and all exercises of enumerated congressional powers like the 
McCulloch test.   
                                                 
8 U.S. CONST . amend. XV, § 5; Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (majority opinion); Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. 
No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009); Sudeep, supra note 7, at 281–283. 
9 Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203.  
10 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623; Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203. 
11 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966). 
12 Derek T. Muller, Judicial Review of Congressional Power Before and After Shelby County v. Holder, 8 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 287, 309 (2013). 
13 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622. 
14 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326 (“‘Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the . . 
. constitution, are constitutional.’”) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).  
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 This new framework implies that any federal law that treats states disparately must be 
sufficiently justified by showing that the problem to be resolved by the statute requires disparate 
treatment of states.  It remains ambiguous after Shelby County whether or not the test described 
in Northwest Austin, and applied in Shelby County, is limited to judicial review of Congressional 
exercises of power under the Fifteenth Amendment alone, or to any departure from the 
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty.15  This Comment argues that the fundamental 
principle of equal sovereignty mandates the standard of review expounded in Shelby County and 
Northwest Austin. 
 More exacting judicial scrutiny of federal statutes that treat states disparately—especially 
in matters traditionally left to the police powers of states—suggests that authority within the 
federalist structure of the Constitution is shifting back towards the states.  The principle’s 
application in cases reviewing statutes that lie at the intersection of the Tenth Amendment and 
Article I16 seems appropriate after Shelby County, considering the modern Court’s jurisprudence 
on the proper federalist structure inherent in the Constitution.17  Thus, the “Court should make 
clear [the Shelby County] standard reaches beyond the context of the Voting Rights Act” and the 
Fifteenth Amendment, and “is not equivalent to the highly-deferential rational basis test.18 
 The Tenth Amendment’s reservation of state sovereignty acts as a limitation on 
congressional power and played an essential role in recent decisions where the Court invalidated 
federal laws.19  The resurgence of the principle of equal sovereignty in Northwest Austin and 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Muller, supra note 12, at 304–05. 
16 U.S. CONST . art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST . amend. X. 
17 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius , 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898 (1997); New York v. United States , 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
18 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 42, N.J. Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, __ 
U.S. __ (2014) (No. 13-979), 2014 WL 636390, at *42.  
19 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius , 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 156 (1992). 
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Shelby County20 is an indication that the Court recognizes an implied fundamental right to 
“equality of the States, in terms of their dignity, power and sovereignty . . . .”21  This right should 
be entitled the constitutional right of equal state sovereignty.22   
 The fundamental right of equal state sovereignty, however, is different from previously 
recognized implied fundamental rights because its enjoyment—and its consequent entitlement to 
judicial protection—is applicable to both state government actors and private citizens.23  This 
conclusion is not inconsistent with the Court’s recognition of the derivative benefits that citizens 
enjoy as a result of federalism,24 and a private citizen’s standing to challenge federal action on 
the basis of a violation of the Tenth Amendment.25   
 Standing of a private citizen on the basis of a violation of separation-of-powers or 
checks-and-balances constraint need not even be predicated upon a “vicarious assertion of a 
State’s constitutional interests.”26  Thus, a state or one of its political subdivisions27 or a private 
citizen28 can invoke the fundamental right as a basis to challenge a federal law that violates the 
principle.  Finally, a violation of the fundamental principle of Equal State Sovereignty demands 
heightened judicial scrutiny and, consequently, less deference to government actors.29  The only 
                                                 
20 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623; Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203. 
21 Brief of Appellant at 20, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (2013) (No. 
13-1714), 2013 WL 1873965, at *20.  
22 Brief of Appellant, supra note 21, at 20. 
23 Compare Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2612 (recognizing the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty and 
extending judicial protection to the exercise of State political authority against federal intrusion), with Harper v. 
Virginia, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (acknowledging the fundamental right of citizens to vote), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (determining the right to have offspring is a basic liberty of citizens that may not be deprived 
by unequal laws). 
24 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992). 
25 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2011). 
26 Id. 
27 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2612.   
28See Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2366.  
29 See Shelby Cnty., 131 S. Ct. at 2623; Brief of Appellant, supra note 21, at 25 (arguing that a violation of the 
fundamental principle of equal state sovereignty requires strict scrutiny). 
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question that remains is what level of scrutiny courts should apply to challenges of departures of 
the fundamental principle. 
 The primary purpose of this Comment is to address the level of scrutiny Courts should 
apply in cases that involve a deviation from the principle of equal state sovereignty, as well as 
the extent of the principle’s application.  This Comment introduces a practical analytical 
framework to apply where a congressional statute is challenged for a departure from the 
principle.  A successful analytical framework should include a well-defined standard to aid lower 
courts in interpreting challenged statutes and a limiting principle to define the boundaries of the 
doctrine’s application and aid Congress’s future legislative decisions. 
 Part II provides a historical overview of the “equal footing doctrine,” which represents 
the early doctrinal development of the present doctrine of equal state sovereignty doctrine and 
the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty.  Part III explains why the Court now recognizes 
an implied fundamental right to equal state sovereignty and discusses its potential implications 
for future public- and private-party plaintiffs.  Part III.A develops an analytical framework for 
application of the equal state sovereignty doctrine.  Part III.B tests the standard by examining 
federal statutes cited by the Shelby County dissent and discusses the implications of this new test 
on the federalist structure of the United States.  This Comment concludes that the equal state 
sovereignty doctrine is a valid constitutional doctrine—now recognized as an implied 
fundamental constitutional right—which will provide judicial protection to both states and 
private citizens against unwarranted expansion of the federal government’s powers.  In order to 
most effectively balance the constitutional interests at stake, this Comment recommends that the 
Court should adopt the Northwest Austin standard as the applicable framework in all cases 
involving the Equal State Sovereignty Doctrine. 
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II. Historical Overview of the Equal State Sovereignty Doctrine 
 The seeds of current constitutional doctrine are often sown early in the Republic’s 
legislative history and case law.  In the case of the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty, 
and its correlative right of equal state sovereignty, the doctrine appeared before the first meeting 
of Congress.  The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 (“the Ordinance”) created federal territory out 
of land ceded by the State of Virginia and the procedure by which such territories became 
states.30  The Ordinance possesses the status of a founding document, because it outlined ideas 
and principles of future political practice in the United States.31  The Ordinance clearly stated 
that when territorial governments “shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, such State 
shall be admitted . . . on an equal footing with the original [s]tates.”32  Thus, America’s earliest 
political bodies, including the Confederate Congress (acting under its authority vested by the 
Articles of Confederation), understood each state would be treated equally in its exercise of 
sovereignty.33 
 State political bodies also recognized that the Constitution’s explicit provisions and 
implicit principles called for the co-equal sovereignty of states, including both the original 
thirteen and states admitted by Congress pursuant to Article IV.34  For example, Kentucky—the 
second state admitted pursuant to Article IV,35 declared in 1824 that “the States of the Union 
should be sovereign, and co-equally so, seems to be not only contemplated, but enjoined by the 
                                                 
30 U.S.C.A., The Organic Laws of the United States of America, Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Article V (2012) 
[hereinafter “Northwest Ordinance”].  A transcript of the document is available at 
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=8&page=transcript . 
31 Denis Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance As A Constitutional Document , 95 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 932 (1995). 
32 Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50 (1787).   
33 Id.  The Northwest Ordinance was enacted by the Confederate Congress in 1787 prior to the ratification of the 
current U.S. Constitution.  Id. 
34 U.S. CONST . Art. IV, § 3 
35 Act of February 4, 1791, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 189 (1791) (admitting Kentucky into the Union). 
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Constitution of the United States.”36  Regardless of its actions later in history, the Kentucky 
legislature later acknowledged that there were limits to this constitutional principle:  “[South 
Carolina] and all other States, are bound by the terms of our constitutional union, to yield 
obedience to the system.”37  Because these documents were created prior to the Supreme Court’s 
own acknowledgement of the doctrine in Pollard v. Hagan, they suggest an universally accepted 
doctrine of equal state sovereignty going back to the Articles of Confederation and through the 
early 1800s. 
A. The Pre-Coyle Cases and the Fundamental Principle’s Early Development 
 An early case used the Northwest Ordinance to analyze compacts between Congress and 
the individual states in which the states ceded territory that ultimately became new sovereign 
states and delineated the sovereign rights of the states that arose out of such compacts.38  In 
Pollard v. Hagan, the Court recognized that its decision would “draw the line that separates the 
sovereignty and jurisdiction of the government of the union, and the state governments . . . .”39  
The Court knew the significance of its decision to both the continuing protection of individual 
state sovereignty and the status of newly-admitted states.  Status as co-equal sovereigns in the 
Union after admission was most likely critical to maintaining a dual sovereignty structure in the 
country’s adolescence.  As a result, Pollard v. Hagan is a seminal case for understanding the 
principle of equal sovereignty and its early recognition by the United States Supreme Court.  The 
Pollard Court created what is now called the principle of equal sovereignty, and held that states 
admitted pursuant to Article IV enter the Union “on an equal footing with the original thirteen 
                                                 
36 Remonstrance of the Legislature of Kentucky, in STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS:  THE STATES 
AND THE UNITED STATES, at 21 (Herman V. Ames, ed., Da Capo Press, 1970) (1824). 
37 Extract From Report of Kentucky in Reply to South Carolina, in STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS:  
THE STATES AND THE UNITED STATES, at 26 (Herman V. Ames, ed., Da Capo Press, 1970) (1824). 
38 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222–24 (1845). 
39 Id.  
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states in all respects.40  The use of the term “equal footing” indeed created some confusion 
throughout the history of the doctrine.41 
 Though the Court could have diminished the states’ sovereignty by limiting the powers of 
newly-admitted states, it instead determined that such states were admitted on an equal footing 
with the original thirteen.42  Thus, the Court held that states created out of territories ceded by 
Georgia in an agreement with the federal government—similar to the Northwest Territory—were 
the successors to all of the authority possessed by Georgia at the time of cession.43  In so holding, 
the Court established the principle that all states possessed an equal amount of dignity and 
sovereign authority regardless of their method of admission to the Union and the date of their 
entry. 
 The post-bellum case of Texas v. White also provides insight into the validity of the 
principle of equal sovereignty.44  In White, the Court faced the question of whether or not the 
states that seceded from the Union in rebellion maintained their status as co-equal sovereigns 
after the war.45  While the Court noted that the states retained their sovereignty, freedom, and 
independence after signing both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, the Court 
also held that the Articles of Confederation created a “perpetual and “indissoluble” Union.46  
Most importantly for the purposes of the present discussion, the Court held that the rebellious 
states—as sovereigns within the Union—never truly seceded, but that the citizens of those states 
seceded and illegally used state governments as a vehicle to achieve secession.47  The Court 
                                                 
40 Id. at 224.  
41 See infra, notes 73–92 and accompanying text. 
42 Id. at 221. 
43 Id. 
44 74 U.S. 700 (1868).  
45 Id. at 724.  
46 Id. at 725. 
47 Id.  
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affirmed the continual existence of states as separate sovereign entities throughout the rebellion 
and that such status did not change as a result of the Civil War.48 
 White is relevant, because the Court determined that those states that rebelled against the 
Union could not have their authority diminished as punishment for the rebellion.49  The Court 
also affirmed the status of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment and the importance of 
the separate existence of states to the political structure of dual sovereignty created by the 
Constitution.50  In essence, the White Court determined that Confederate states always remained 
states in the Union, as equal partners in a joint enterprise, despite their professed rebellion.51 
B. The Coyle Decision and Post-Coyle Development of the Fundamental Principle of 
Equal  Sovereignty 
 
 The principle of equal sovereignty arose again shortly after the admission of Oklahoma 
into the Union, in the Court’s decision in Coyle v. Smith.52  Unlike the earlier pre-Coyle cases 
that dealt with the abstract proposition of equal sovereignty,53 the Coyle decision directly 
addressed an attempted Congressional infringement on state’s co-equal sovereignty.  It is 
therefore critical to understand the factual background of the controversy at issue in Coyle to be 
able to appreciate its value to the doctrine of equal sovereignty. 
 In 1906, Congress passed an Act admitting Oklahoma into the Union and imposing an 
unprecedented precondition to admission by requiring it to maintain Guthrie, Oklahoma, as the 
state’s capital city until 1913.54  Oklahoma’s legislature defiantly moved its capital to Oklahoma 
                                                 
48 Id. 
49 Id.  
50 Texas v. White, 7 U.S. 700, 724 (1868).  
51 Id. at 726. 
52 221 U.S. 559 (1911).   
53 Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 245 (1900) (“It has often been said that a state admitted into the Union enters 
therein in full equality with all the others, and such equality may forbid any agreement or compact limiting or 
qualifying political rights and obligations.”). 
54 Coyle, 221 U.S. at 564. 
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City and appropriated funds for the construction of buildings necessary to the proper function of 
a state government.55  The plaintiff-in-error originally brought the case to the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court to protect his property interests in the city of Guthrie.56 
 The Coyle Court first affirmed the proposition that all states admitted to the Union are 
admitted on an equal footing with the original thirteen states.57  In general, the Court held that 
Congress generally could not impose restrictions on a state’s sovereignty as a condition to the 
state’s admission to the Union.58  Specifically, the Court held that Congress exceeded its powers 
under the Guaranty and Admissions Clauses in Article IV by diminishing the sovereignty of 
Oklahoma.59 
 The Court also reiterated its interpretation of the federalist structure, consistent with its 
statement in White, and the importance of preserving state sovereign power under the 
Constitution.60  The Court implied the supremacy of any state government action in any matter 
“which was not plainly within the regulating power of Congress.”61 The Court expressly held 
that Congress could not restrict a state’s exercise of sovereignty merely because the state desired 
admission to the Union.62  In essence, the Court outlined the limits of congressional power to 
create terms of admission to states; by no means could Congress invade areas of state 
sovereignty through the use of its Admissions powers.63 
                                                 
55 Id. at 562. 
56 Id. at 688.  
57 Id. at 567.  
58 Id. 
59 U.S. CONST . art. IV, § 3 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union . . . .”); U.S. CONST . art. 
IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government  . . . .”); 
Coyle, 221 U.S. at 566–68 (1911). 
60 Coyle, 221 U.S. at 567 (“‘This Union was and is a union of states, equal in power, dignity, and authority, each 
competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United States by the Constitution itself.”).  
61 Id. at 574. 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
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 The last paragraph of the Coyle decision is an incredibly important authority indicating 
the modern understanding of the principle of equal sovereignty.  In that paragraph the Court cites 
former Chief Justice Chase’s opinions in Texas v. White and Lane County v. Oregon to affirm the 
importance of the separate existence of state governments to the Union’s republican form of 
government.64  Justice Lurton, writing for the majority, then declared that “the constitutional 
equality of states is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic 
was organized.”65 
 Coyle represents the first opinion in which the Court addresses the status of states as 
equals in the Union subsequent to their admission.  Although the case involved a condition 
placed upon Oklahoma for its admission to the Union, the last paragraph of Coyle declares that 
every state is equal under the Constitution ad infinitum.66  Significantly, the Court decided Coyle 
over four decades after the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments,67 and the decision 
represents the opinion of leading American jurists at the time.  
 Though the Court rendered its decision in Coyle in the context of Oklahoma’s admission 
to the Union, the rule stated in the last paragraph of the opinion did not limit the principle of 
equal sovereignty to the context of newly-admitted states.68  Justice Lurton did not qualify his 
statement with any condition or limit the rule to any particular context.  The Court cited ample 
case law to support the proposition that every state retained certain powers inherent in the 
concept of sovereignty that could never be “constitutionally diminished, impaired, or shorn away 
                                                 
64 Id. at 579–80 (“Chief Justice Chase said in strong and memorable language that ‘the Constitution . . . looks to an 
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible states. . . . Without the states in union there could be no such 
political body as the United States.”). 
65 Id. at 580.  
66 Coyle, 221 U.S. at 580. 
67 U.S. CONST . amends. XIII, XIV, XV.  
68 Coyle, 221 U.S. at 580 (“[T]he constitutional equality of the states is essential to the harmonious operation of the 
scheme upon which the Republic was organized.”). 
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by any conditions, compacts, or stipulations.”69  Put simply, the fundamental principle of equal 
sovereignty and its omnipresence in constitutional law was axiomatic before its later 
diminishment in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.70  The Court decided Coyle after the ratification 
of the Reconstruction Amendments, and Coyle proves that the Court recognized a long-standing 
tradition of sovereign equality of all states well beyond the passage of those amendments.  
 Though the facts in Coyle involved Oklahoma and its admission to the Union, the 
doctrine was never limited to the context of newly-admitted states.  The principle of equal 
sovereignty was only applied to the context of newly-admitted states due to the facts and 
circumstances of particular cases.71  The Oklahoma legislature enacted the state law at issue in 
Coyle after its admission into the Union.  Thus, the fundamental principles of equal sovereignty 
are not limited, and never were limited, to the “terms upon which States are admitted to the 
Union . . . .”72 
C. Divergence of the Doctrine:  States’ Property Rights vs. States’ Rights of Equal 
Sovereignty 
  
 Two separate doctrines emerge from Coyle: the “doctrine of equal footing” and the 
“doctrine of equal sovereignty.”  This distinction is subtle, but does indeed exist in the post-
Coyle development of case law.  After Coyle, the doctrine deviates into two separate paths:  one 
dealing with the property rights of states relative to the federal government along river waterbeds 
(“doctrine of equal footing”) and the other addressing the sovereign equality of states relative to 
their treatment by the federal government (“doctrine of equal sovereignty”).   
                                                 
69 Id. at 573. 
70 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
71 See, e.g., McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka, & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 159 (1914) (decided three years after 
Coyle). 
72 Contra South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966).  
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 Although this Comment deals strictly with the doctrine of equal sovereignty, it is 
necessary to clarify the post-Coyle divergence before examining the modern interpretation of the 
principle.  The modern “equal footing” doctrine addresses the states’ assumption of legal title to 
the land along any riverbed within its territory upon admission to the Union.73  The first case to 
cite the doctrine of equal footing was Pollard v. Hagan, because Pollard addressed the equal 
sovereignty of Alabama relative to the federal government in the context of title to the land along 
a waterbed.74  In modern jurisprudence, the doctrine of “equal footing” refers to states’ title to 
land under navigable waters after admission to the Union.75   
 Unfortunately, the Court continued to cite the Pollard opinion’s proposition that states 
are “admitted on an equal footing” to address issues regarding the principle of equal state 
sovereignty until its decision Northwest Austin.76  This created confusion and produced a split in 
opinion over the proper scope of the doctrine77 due to its earlier terminology.  Even after 
Katzenbach, which expressly stated the doctrine “applies only to the terms upon which States are 
admitted to the Union,”78 the Court recognized the continuing validity of the doctrine and 
Coyle’s holding in the context of federal intervention in states’ relationships with their 
employees.79   
                                                 
73 See, e.g., Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 371 (1977). 
74 44 U.S. 212, 224 (1845) 
75 See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 284 (1997); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 
19, 42, supplemented United States v. California, 332 U.S. 804 (1947).   
76 See, e.g., Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566–68 (1911). 
77 See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013) (“[T]he fundamental principle of equal 
sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.”) (emphasis added); id. 
at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he principle ‘applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the 
Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.” ) (citing South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966)). 
78 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966). 
79 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976) overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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 This Comment suggests that the confusion and inconsistency in the Court’s application of 
the doctrine of equal state sovereignty is a direct result of the use of the phrase “equal footing” in 
Pollard v. Hagan and the factual circumstances involved in Coyle.  Yet neither case involved 
terms of admission of newly-admitted states as suggested by the Katzenbach Court.80  Pollard 
involved a property dispute between two landowners, and the issue of whether or not the federal 
government or the state of Alabama owned title to the land in question after Alabama’s 
admission into the Union was dispositive.81  It did not involve the Alabama’s admission, but 
rather the status of Alabama as a newly-admitted state in the Union.82  Though it is true that 
Congress violated the principle of equal sovereignty in Coyle through an unconstitutional 
exercise of power by attaching an invalid term of admission, the application of the principle 
determined whether or not a sovereign act by Oklahoma four years after its admission was 
prohibited.83  Finally, post-Coyle case law indicates the principle of equal sovereignty was never 
limited to the terms of admission of states. 
 Three years after Coyle, the Court invoked the doctrine of equal state sovereignty to 
address Oklahoma’s power to enact laws with the same authority as a co-equal sovereign with 
other states.84  Thus, almost immediately after Coyle, the rule as stated in Coyle was applied to 
evaluate the constitutionality of Oklahoman legislation.85  The Court still unfortunately identified 
the doctrine barring the limitation of state sovereignty as the doctrine of “equal footing” in 
McCabe.86  In McCabe, the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty is apparently applied, but 
                                                 
80 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328–29 (1966). 
81 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 219–20 (1845). 
82 Id. at 222–24. 
83 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 563–65 (1911). 
84 McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka, & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 159–60 (1914). 
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
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referred to by citation to the long line of cases using the phrase “equal footing” to support the 
doctrine’s proposition.87   
 Although the terminology remained the same for some time, the “doctrine of equal 
footing” split into two separate doctrines after Coyle, which both deal with separate 
constitutional issues.88  This reliance on the phrase found in Pollard to cases like Coyle perhaps 
caused the Court’s confusion in the 1960s when it first evaluated the Voting Rights Act.89  In 
Katzenbach, the Court—for the first and last time—erroneously referred to the principle of equal 
sovereignty as “the doctrine of the equality of States.”90  The insignificant treatment with which 
the Court treated the doctrine of equal state sovereignty in Katzenbach was unprecedented, and 
this non-recognition was effectively abrogated by the Shelby County decision.91 
 Beginning in 1917, the Court regularly invoked “the doctrine of equal footing”—now 
known as the principle of equal sovereignty or doctrine of equal state sovereignty—in the 
context of a state’s authority to pass laws as a separate sovereign under the Constitution.92  In 
Hawkins, the Court reviewed the Iowa legislature’s workmen’s compensation legislation for its 
alleged unconstitutionality under the federal Constitution.93  The plaintiff argued that a 
workmen’s compensation law violated a provision of the Act of Congress accepting Iowa into 
the Union as a territory in 1838 and the acts of Congress that admitted the State of Iowa in 1845 
                                                 
87 Id. at 159 (“Oklahoma was admitted to the Union ‘on an equal footing with the original states,’ and, with respect 
to the matter in question, had authority to enact such laws, not in conflict with the Federal Constitution, as other 
States could enact.”) (emphasis added). 
88 Compare PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1229 (2012) (“To determine title to a riverbed under 
the equal-footing doctrine,” with Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 217 (1917) (using the phrase “equal footing” to 
address the validity of a State law in contravention of the laws in effect when the State was a territory and under the 
authority of Congress).   
89 South Carolina  v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 
2612 (2013). 
90 Id. 
91 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623–24. 
92 Hawkins, 243 U.S. 210. 
93 Id. at 213–16.   
17 
 
and 1846.94  These Acts were enacted pursuant to the power given to Congress under the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787.95  The plaintiff argued that Iowa’s workmen’s compensation 
legislation enacted by the state legislature violated the aforementioned congressional acts and the 
Northwest Ordinance96 by creating an expedited procedure by which injured employees could 
claim benefits under the law.97 
 The Court categorically rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the legislation violated the 
provisions of the Northwest Ordinance.98  The Court also rejected the argument that the Acts of 
Congress creating and regulating the Iowa territory and its grant of admission to the Union could 
restrict the sovereignty of the state.99  The plaintiff attempted to use a seventy-five-year-old 
federal act of law to limit the ability of the state to regulate an area of the law100 that traditionally 
was left to the state to regulate.101  The Iowa legislature enacted the challenged state law, 
however, by an Act of the Iowa assembly in 1913,102 and the Court reviewed the law only in 
1917.  
 The Court invoked the “doctrine of equal footing” in dismissing the argument that the 
congressional Acts of admission limited the authority of Iowa to pass legislation seventy-one 
                                                 
94 Id. at 216–17.  
95 Northwest Ordinance, art. 2, 1 Stat. 50 (1787) (“The inhabitants of the said territory [including Iowa] shall always 
be entitled to the benefits . . . of the trial by jury.”) (emphasis added). 
96 Hawkins, 243 U.S. at 216 (“Objection is made that the act dispenses with trial by jury.”) 
97 Id. at 214–16 (describing the procedure under the new state law). 
98 Id. at 216 (stating that the territory that eventually gave rise to the State of Iowa was created out of land purchased 
off of France as part of the Louisiana Purchase of 1803). 
99 Id. at 217 (“This [argument] is easily disposed of. The Act of 1838 was no more than a regulation of territory 
belonging to the United States . . . and the act for admitting the state  . . . admitted it ‘on an equal footing with the 
original states in all respects whatsoever.’”). 
100 That area is state tort law, since the Iowa workmen’s compensation legislation abolished the common -law rules 
of negligence presumptions, burdens of proof, and elements.  This formed the basis for the plaintiff’s argument that 
the law had abolished the right to trial by jury. Id. at 213–214.  “[Such policies are] clearly within the domain of 
state governments.”  Id. at 214. 
101 See Hawkins, 243 U.S. at 212 (reviewing other state workmen’s compensation laws at the time of the opinion). 
102 Id. at 211. 
18 
 
years after the admission of the state to the Union.103  The invocation of the doctrine to explain 
the invalidity of the plaintiff’s argument demonstrates that the doctrine of equal sovereignty was 
not limited to a ban on Congress imposing conditions on newly-admitted states that diminished 
their sovereignty.  The Court cited Coyle in support of the proposition that the equal state 
sovereignty doctrine’s application continues ad infinitum to all constitutional acts of a state after 
its admission into the Union.104  The Hawkins decision holds that the sovereign equality of states 
is never diminished and that all states retain the same sovereignty as the original thirteen 
states.105 
 The Court recognized the doctrine of “equal footing”106 again in Skiriotes v. State of 
Florida.107  The Skiriotes Court began its analysis by unequivocally stating, “[s]ave for the 
powers committed by the Constitution to the Union, the State of Florida has retained the status of 
a sovereign.”108  The Court again applied the doctrine of equal state sovereignty in reasoning that 
Florida’s admission to the Union allowed the state to be admitted on an equal footing with the 
original thirteen states “in all respects whatsoever.”109  The opinion also cited Florida’s Act of 
admission in support of the proposition that every state is equal in its exercise of sovereignty 
subsequent to its admission to the Union.110 
  The Skiriotes Court unambiguously cited the holding in Coyle to state the rule that there 
is a sovereign equality of states in their exercise of authority under the Constitution’s Tenth 
                                                 
103 Id. at 217. 
104 Id. 
105 Id.  
106 The Court uses “equal footing” to refer to what the Author of this Comment calls the doctrine of equal state 
sovereignty.  The use of the term “equal footing” to refer to the present doctrine is not truly differentiated by the 
Court until Northwest Austin v. Holder in 2009, although the distinction in the case law is made clear from the 
discussion above. 
107 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. (citing Congress’s Act of March 3, 1845, 5 Stat. 742.). 
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Amendment.111  Skiriotes was decided in 1945, and, similar to the legislation in Hawkins, the 
Florida legislature enacted the legislation at issue nearly a century after Florida’s admission to 
the Union.  The Skiriotes opinion is significant, because it demonstrated the consistent 
application of the principle of equal sovereignty during the post-Coyle period outside the context 
of newly-admitted states’ sovereignty.  The principle’s application, although still referred to as 
the doctrine of “equal footing” in Skiriotes, made clear that the principle was not limited 
historically to the terms of admission of new states.112  The state statute at issue in Skiriotes was 
enacted eighty-two years after Florida’s admission into the Union.113   
 The cases above demonstrate the Court’s understanding of the “equal footing” doctrine 
both before and after Coyle.114  It is clear that by 1941, the Court recognized a long-existing 
doctrine of equal sovereignty but the nomenclature had not changed since Pollard.  Between 
Pollard and Skiriotes, however, the doctrine evolved in two separate directions.  The modern 
“equal footing” doctrine is largely confined to legal issues regarding title to land underneath 
navigable waters in modern constitutional law.115  
 Although the principle of equal sovereignty arose out of the doctrine of equal footing, the 
Court has applied the equal sovereignty doctrine only when a state’s authority to pass laws as 
sovereign is challenged.116  In 1950, the Court recognized that “[t]he ‘equal footing’ clause has 
long been held to refer to political rights and to sovereignty,”117 and finally acknowledged the 
                                                 
111 Id. (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)). 
112 Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 77. 
113 Id. at 70. 
114 Compare Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845), with Skiriotes, 313 U.S. 69.   
115 See, e.g., PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012); Ut. Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 
193, 196 (1987).  
116 See, e.g., Skiriotes, 313 U.S. 69. 




doctrinal distinction between its prior application in different contexts.  The Court by then was 
using the phrase “equal footing” to implicitly refer to the principle of equal sovereignty.118 
 In modern constitutional law and debate, the doctrine of “equal footing” is confined to 
the context of state property rights relative to the federal government,119 while a state’s rights to 
equal sovereignty is now distinct and referred to as the principle of equal sovereignty.120  The 
principle of equal sovereignty’s development through over a century in the Court’s decisions 
under the term “equal footing” should not be confused with the modern “equal footing” doctrine.  
The Northwest Austin decision finally eradicated the confusion of the two doctrines with its 
reference to the “principle of equal sovereignty.”121 
III. Equal State Sovereignty:  A New Implied Fundamental Right 
 An understanding of the increased importance of federalism and the separation-of-powers 
limitations to the modern Court’s understanding of the Tenth Amendment is critical to the 
development of the newly-acknowledged, implied fundamental right to equal state sovereignty in 
Shelby County.  The Court’s interpretation of the Tenth Amendment changed drastically after its 
recognition that federalism is a political system “more sensitive to the diverse needs of a 
heterogeneous society,” which permits “innovation and experimentation,” enables greater citizen 
“involvement in democratic processes,” and makes government “more responsive by putting the 
States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”122  Since Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court has 
consistently acknowledged a theoretical basis for the extension of the Tenth Amendment’s 
                                                 
118 Id. at 716. 
119 See Valerie J.M. Brader, Congress’ Pet: Why the Clean Air Act's Favoritism of California Is Unconstitutional 
Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, 13 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 119, 146–47 (2007). 
120 E.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2623, 2625 (2013) (“Not only do States retain sovereignty under the 
Constitution, there is also a ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the States  . . . .”) (citing Northwest 
Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)). 
121 Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203. 
122 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).  
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protection to both states123 and private-party plaintiffs.124  The revitalization of federalist 
principles has coincided with the limitation of the scope of congressional remedial powers under 
the Reconstruction Amendments.125 
 The Court’s reinvigoration of federalist principles in Gregory v. Ashcroft followed the 
theoretical development and recognition of the values inherent in federalism and the federalist 
structure’s importance to individual rights and autonomy.126  Many of the cases cited in the 
Northwest Austin decision were found in scholarly works in the late-1980s.127  While the Court 
recognized the importance of its own expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause,128 the 
Spending Clause,129 and the Supremacy Clause130 to the expansion of federal power relative to 
the states in New York v. United States, it noted that the federalist framework remained the 
same.131 
 New York was the first case in which the Court substantially limited the federal 
government’s ability to regulate areas traditionally reserved to the states pursuant to their police 
powers.132  Interestingly, the Court cited Coyle133 and reaffirmed the federalist principles134 that 
                                                 
123 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) 
124 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2361–65 (2011). 
125 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
126 Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for A Third Century, 88 COLUM. 
L. REV. 3–10 (1988). 
127 Merrit, supra note 126, at 10. 
128 U.S. CONST ., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 
129 U.S. CONST ., art. I, § 8, cl. 1 
130 U.S. CONST ., art. VI, cl. 2 
131 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992) (“The actual scope of the Federal Government's authority 
with respect to the States has changed over the years, therefore, but the constitutional structure underlying and 
limiting that authority has not.”). 
132 Id.  
133 Id. at 162 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)). 
134 Id. (“Both the States and the United States existed before the Constitution. The people, through that instrument, 
established a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the 
citizens, instead of the Confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the States.”) 
(citing Lane Cnty. v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868)).  Justice Lurton cited this same opinion in support of h is 
proclamation of equal sovereignty at the end of the Coyle opinion.  Coyle, 221 U.S. at 579–80. 
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logically underlie the principle of equal sovereignty as stated by the Coyle Court eighty-two 
years before New York.  The Court noted that even when Congress is granted the power to 
compel or prohibit citizens’ acts, the Court never extended that power to include “directly 
compel[ling] the States to require or prohibit those acts.”135  Thus, the New York decision limited 
Congress’s powers to that of encouragement, regulation, or preemption where constitutionally 
permissible.136   
 In essence, New York limited the ability of Congress to invade areas of traditional state 
regulation, or to truly compel states—as opposed to an individual citizen of the United States—
to act in a certain manner at all.137  The central holding in New York is the anti-commandeering 
principle, which is a the fundamental right of states not to be directly forced into enacting and 
enforcing a federal regulation.138  The Court’s decision in New York, when considered in 
conjunction with Bond v. United States139 and Shelby County v. Holder,140 created a fundamental 
right of states not to be commandeered and to be treated as co-equal sovereigns in all respects.141   
 When Congress commandeers a state’s government, it violates the Tenth Amendment 
and diminishes the sovereign equality of the targeted state or states.  Congress may place no 
statutory obligation on a state to act in a certain way,142 because states possess a fundamental 
right against such diminishment of their sovereignty.  A departure from the doctrine of equal 
                                                 
135 New York , 505 U.S. at 166. 
136 Id. at 166–69. 
137 Id. at 144 (“In providing for a stronger central government, therefore, the Framers explicitly chose a Constit ution 
that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.”) (emphasis added). 
138 Id. at 161 (“Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’”) (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). 
139 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011). 
140 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
141 New York v. United States , 505 U.S. 141, 161. 
142 Branch v. United States, 538 U.S. 254 (2003). 
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state sovereignty is particularly egregious when Congress treats states disparately.143  Even as 
early as New York, the Court recognized that Congress must have a “sufficiently important” 
federal interest to justify a violation of a state’s rights as sovereign.144  Every state’s fundamental 
right to equal sovereignty is explicitly recognized in the Court’s test for violations of the Tenth 
Amendment, as set forth in New York.145  While the New York test requires a sufficiently 
important federal interest to compel a state to enact or regulate in conformity with a federal 
regulatory regime, any departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires 
that a congressional “statute’s disparate geographic coverage be sufficiently related to the 
problem it targets.”146 
 The standing of private citizens to challenge federal laws on the basis of a violation of the 
Tenth Amendment did not quickly follow New York.  The extension of standing to private 
citizens to challenge violations of Tenth Amendment by Congress in Bond,147 however, makes 
the recognition of a right to Equal State Sovereignty seem certain.  The right to Equal State 
Sovereignty, or the standing to challenge violations of any principles of federalism, is not limited 
to the state itself.148  A private citizen now possesses a legally cognizable right to challenge the 
federal government’s usurpation of authority traditionally left to the state.149  If an individual can 
                                                 
143 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
144 New York , 505 U.S. at 177.   
145 Id. (“In determining whether the Tenth Amendment limits the ability of Congress to subject state governments to 
generally applicable laws, the Court . . . will evaluate the strength of federal interests in light of the degree to which 
such laws would prevent the State from functioning as a sovereign  . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
146Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2622.  
147 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2011).   
148 Id. 
149 Id.  
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demonstrate harm from a federal undermining of state sovereignty, the individual citizen is 
entitled to the protection and rights traditionally afforded to the state.150 
 Shortly after the expansion of private-party standing to challenge violations of the Tenth 
Amendment and federalist principles, Shelby County unequivocally announced that the 
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains “highly pertinent in assessing subsequent 
disparate treatment of States.”151 Shelby County’s demand that “any departure from the 
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty”152 meet the requirements of the Northwest Austin 
test compels the conclusion that there is now an implied fundamental right to equal sovereignty 
that is enjoyed by all states. 
 A private litigant challenging a federal law on Tenth Amendment grounds need not even 
assert the state’s constitutional interests in his or her claim.153  If the private litigant may 
challenge a law “enacted in contravention of constitutional principles of federalism,”154 then how 
can a state not be entitled to assert its rights under the doctrine of equal state sovereignty?155  The 
“individual liberty rights” of private parties are as threatened as state interests under such 
circumstances.156 
 The aforementioned case law and a scrupulous review of constitutional principles 
developed since New York suggest the conclusion that states possess a right to equal sovereignty 
                                                 
150 Id. (“[A]ction that exceeds the National Government's enumerated powers undermines the  sovereign interests of 
States [and t]he unconstitutional action can cause concomitant injury to persons in individual cases.”). 
151 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624.  
152 Id. at 2622 
153 Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2365.  
154 Id.  
155 Id. at 2364 (“[L]imitations that federalism entails are not therefore a matter of rights belonging only to the 
States.”)  (emphasis added).  This language strongly suggests that the Tenth Amendment giv es positive rights to the 
states as well as private litigants. 
156 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 43, N.J. Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n , No. 
___ (U.S. ___ 2014) [see note at FN 18] 
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that must be protected by the judiciary the same way any fundamental right is protected.157  At 
the very least, this Comment argues that the Court recognized the fundamental principle of equal 
sovereignty as far back as 1845158 and that the Court has invoked the principle throughout 
American constitutional history.159 
 Assuming that there is a right to equal state sovereignty, two questions arise:  (1) whether 
the right is confined to the exercise of congressional power pursuant to the Fifteenth 
Amendment; and (2) what judicial scrutiny courts should apply in reviewing any federal law that 
violates that right.  Some have argued that courts should apply strict scrutiny to any action that 
burdens a fundamental right.160  This argument focuses on the liberty interests of individual 
citizens that are burdened when states suffer a violation of their right to equal state 
sovereignty.161  This Comment argues, however, that the test developed in Northwest Austin and 
applied in Shelby County is a form of intermediate review, because it is not as exacting as strict 
scrutiny. 
A. The New Standard of Review:  Northwest Austin and Intermediate Scrutiny for 
Violations of the Doctrine of Equal State Sovereignty 
 
 The Court developed the current test for “any” departures from the fundamental principle 
of equal sovereignty in Northwest Austin v. Holder.162  As stated above, the Supreme Court held 
that “any departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that 
                                                 
157 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (protecting the right of citizens to vote and 
depriving a statute of its normal presumption of constitutionality). 
158 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
159 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Northwest Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 
(2009); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917); Coyle v. Smith, 221 
U.S. 559 (1911); Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223 (1900); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1868); Permoli v. New 
Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845).  Contra South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (denying the application 
of the principle beyond the context of conditions imposed upon newly -admitted states). 
160 Brief for Appellant, supra note 22, at *25.  
161 Brief for Appellant, supra note21, at *24–25. 
162 Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (2009) (emphasis added).   
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a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”163  
The Court held in Shelby County that the Voting Rights Act no longer meets the requirements of 
that test because the law’s disparate geographic burdens were not sufficiently related to the 
problem the law targeted.164  This statement of rule is consistent with the Court’s statement in 
New York that “[w]here a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it 
must do so directly [and not commandeer state governments].”165   
 There is no logical reason to support the assertion that the fundamental principle of equal 
sovereignty is limited to the context of the Fifteenth Amendment.  The principle’s application is 
found in the historical documents created even before the Constitution,166 state documents in the 
ante-bellum period,167 and case law from 1845168 until the present day.169  Therefore, the 
principle of equal sovereignty has never been limited to the context of the Fifteenth Amendment, 
and easily outdates the amendment itself by any measure.  In fact, some have even argued that 
the only instances in which the Court has allowed “any departure . . . from the fundamental 
principle of equal sovereignty have involved federal laws that enforce rights guaranteed by the 
Reconstruction Amendments.”170   
 Also, if the principle of equal sovereignty is limited to the Fifteenth Amendment, then 
“unchecked plenary Congressional power to balkanize the nation and create the equivalent of 
                                                 
163 Id. (emphasis added). 
164 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2623–30 (“Northwest Austin requires an Act’s ‘disparate geographic 
coverage’ to be ‘sufficiently related’ to its targeted problems.”).   
165 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992) (emphasis added). 
166 Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50 (1787).   
167 See supra, notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
168 See supra, notes 38–121 and accompanying text. 
169 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622. 
170 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 36, N.J. Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, __ 
U.S. __ (2014) (No. 13-979), 2014 WL 636390, at *36. 
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internal colonies” is permitted.171  As a result, this Comment suggests that the principle is neither 
limited to congressional power under the Fifteenth Amendment nor to the Reconstruction 
Amendments generally, but rather acts as an integral part of American constitutional law and the 
“Court’s jurisprudence since 1845.”172  For these reasons, the Court should explicitly 
acknowledge the principle of equal state sovereignty as a fundamental right of states and their 
citizens, and designate a standard of review for any departures from the principle.   
 This Comment argues that the test expounded in Northwest Austin and Shelby County is 
perfect for balancing federal interests and the modern necessity of centralized political power 
with the states’ right to equal sovereignty.  Under the Northwest Austin test, a federal statute 
must be sufficiently related to the problem it targets if the statute treats states disparately.173  This 
test is much less exacting than the Court’s prior application of, for example, unconstitutional 
racial classifications.174  Unlike the Court’s expression of exacting judicial scrutiny in other 
cases, the Court in Shelby County demanded that the statute only “impose[] burdens” that can 
“be justified by current needs.”175  This standard is markedly different from the stringent 
requirement of a “compelling government purpose” needed under strict scrutiny.176    
 A statute facing review under the Northwest Austin test need not be “narrowly tailored” 
as well; rather, its disparate geographic coverage must be “sufficiently related” to the problem it 
targets.177  A close reading of the choice of words in the Northwest Austin test suggests that the 
Court did not apply strict scrutiny for departures from the fundamental principle of equal 
                                                 
171 Id. at 39. 
172 Id. at 36. 
173 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622. 
174 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (“Federal racial classifications, like those of a 
State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.”) 
(emphasis added). 
175 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622. 
176 See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 235. 
177 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622.   
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sovereignty.  The right to equal state sovereignty should not require such exacting scrutiny—at 
least when a state raises it as the basis for challenging a federal law—because states possess vast 
public resources and other fundamental rights and responsibilities under the Constitution.  
Although these public resources are not even comparable to the vast wealth possessed by the 
federal branches of government, the ability to tap these resources to settle disputes justifies a less 
demanding form of review than when an individual citizen’s fundamental rights are threatened 
by government action.  
 The Northwest Austin test falls somewhere in between strict scrutiny review and rational 
basis review.  At least one author suggests that the Court declined to address the standard of 
review in both Northwest Austin and Shelby County.178  Yet Derek T. Muller confines his 
reasoning to the standard of review for any exercise of congressional authority pursuant to any 
enumerated power.179  Muller does agree, however, that the test employed in Shelby County is 
supported by the Court’s past practices and that it provides further evidence of the modern 
Court’s unwillingness to allow congressional power to exceed its constitutional bounds.180  
Congress’s potential exercise of enumerated powers, however, is too varied to limit any exercise 
of any enumerated power to one standard of review.  Thus, this Comment only agrees that the 
Northwest Austin and Shelby County standard is appropriate in any judicial review of departures 
from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty.   
 The Northwest test may be classified as an “intermediate” form of review: slightly less 
demanding and more deferential than review under strict scrutiny, and slightly less deferential to 
congressional findings and more demanding in its inspection of the law’s validity than rational 
                                                 
178 Muller, supra note12, at 305. 
179 Muller, supra note12, at 288. 
180 Muller, supra note 12, at 317–18. 
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basis.  This level of scrutiny is appropriate because it adequately balances the preservation of 
individual states’ sovereignty against the congressional need to address geographically disparate 
problems through legislation. 
 And while the principles of “[f]ederalism also protect[] the liberty of all persons within a 
State,”181 the independent political needs of a state government should not be considered entitled 
to the same protection as that of, for example, the right to vote.182  Thus, the Northwest test 
strikes the perfect balance between the centripetal pressures of modern commerce and the 
traditional centrifugal distribution of authority within the federalist structure of government.  For 
the purposes of analysis, an application of the test to different federal statutes may properly 
elucidate the suitability of applying the Northwest Austin test when a state—or a state’s citizen—
asserts a violation of the doctrine of equal state sovereignty. 
B. Testing the Test:  Applying the Northwest Austin Test to Different Federal Statutes 
 Justice Ginsburg, in the dissenting opinion in Shelby County, argued that the majority 
misapplied the principle of equal sovereignty, argued that “federal statutes that treat states 
disparately are hardly novel,” and questioned whether “such provisions remain safe given the 
Court’s expansion of equal sovereignty’s sway.”183  While federal statutes do indeed often treat 
states disparately, not all of these statutes will necessarily fail the Northwest Austin test.  The 
following application of the test to two fundamentally different federal statutes—one that meets 
the requirements of the test and one that fails—illustrates the strengths of the test and its 
potential application in the future. 
                                                 
181 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2363 (2011). 
182 See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (protecting the right of individual citizens to vote). 
183 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
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 The federal Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) limits its ban on 
state-sponsored sports betting to states where “[an  authorized sports-betting] scheme . . . 
actually was conducted in that state or other governmental entity at any time during the period 
beginning September 1, 1989, and ending October 2, 1991.”184  In the most recent review of the 
constitutionality of PASPA, federal courts afforded the statute a presumption of 
constitutionality.185  If the Supreme Court grants certiorari, this Comment anticipates the Court 
will review PAPSA under the Northwest Austin “sufficiently related” test. 
 The Shelby County dissent cited PASPA in support of the proposition that the majority’s 
unprecedented expansion of the principle of equal sovereignty could cause “much mischief” to 
federal statutes.186  PASPA does treat states disparately by preventing the passage of any sports 
wagering scheme by state governments other than those states exempted by Section 3704.187  
PASPA violates the principle of equal sovereignty because the problem it addresses (sports 
wagering sanctioned by state governments) is not sufficiently related to its disparate geographic 
coverage.188  PASPA restricts states in their exercise of authority in an “area subject to the 
States’ traditional police powers.”189  PASPA represents the type of infringement upon equal 
state sovereignty that the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty is designed to prohibit. 
 Because PASPA’s disparate geographic coverage (the law’s prohibition, in effect, is 
limited to forty-six states) is not sufficiently related to the problem of sports betting,190 PASPA 
violates the doctrine of equal state sovereignty and should be declared unconstitutional upon 
                                                 
184 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2006). 
185 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 575 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013). 
186 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649. 
187 28 U.S.C. §§ 3702, 3704 (2006); see Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 571 (“Congress has 
chosen through PASPA to limit the geographic localities in which sports wagering is lawful.”).  
188 But see Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 926 F. Supp. 2d. at 571. 
189 Id. at 571.  
190 28 U.S.C. §§ 3702, 3704 (2006). 
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future review.191  PASPA treats states disparately, in effect, through the language of its 
exemptions in Section 3704.192   PASPA also reduces the ability of states that are not exempted 
by the law to raise revenue through enacting legislation authorizing sports betting.193 
 PASPA is the type of law that would be covered under the doctrine of equal state 
sovereignty because it treats states disparately on its face.  The problem the statute addresses is 
not sufficiently related to the statute’s disparate geographic effect.  “Congress enacted PASPA in 
1992 in response to growing efforts by States to allow sports wagering.”194  Yet, “PASPA 
completely ‘releases Nevada from PASPA’s grip.’”195  Finally, PASPA intrudes upon a 
traditional area of state sovereignty.   
 Thus, PASPA’s unequal treatment of states is not sufficiently related to the problem it 
targets.  If Congress’s purpose was to limit sports wagering, or stop the spread of sports 
wagering, then how can an exemption for Nevada from PASPA’s coverage be sufficiently 
related to the problem of ending or curbing the spread of sports wagering?  In Nevada alone, “at 
least $2.9 billion” per year is wagered on sports.196  Allowing an exemption from PASPA to the 
state that sanctions the most sports wagering in the country—while simultaneously prohibiting 
other states from enjoying the benefits of legalized sports betting—is an excellent example of 
congressional disparate treatment of sovereign states.  This disparate treatment, and its lack of 
any relationship to ending or preventing the spread of sports wagering, would be found 
unconstitutional under the Northwest Austin standard.  States could then begin to enjoy the 
                                                 
191 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d 208. 
192 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2006).   
193 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12A-1–5:12A-6  (West 2012), abrogated by Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 926 F. 
Supp. 2d at 571. 
194 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, N.J. Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, __ 
U.S. __ (2014) (No. 13-979), 2014 WL 636390, at *5 
195Id. at 6. 
196 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, N.J. Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, __ 
U.S. __ (2014) (No. 13-979), 2014 WL 636390, at *7. 
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benefits of taxing sports wagering and “staunch the sports wagering black market by allowing . . 
. taxable sports wagering venues.”197 
 Justice Ginsburg also cited, in the Shelby County dissent, the federal statute that limits 
federal funding for nuclear waste disposal to the state of Nevada after December 22, 1987.198  
This federal statute, like PASPA, provides for disparate treatment of all states except Nevada in 
its grant of federal funds for the purpose of disposing of nuclear waste at the Yucca Mountain 
site.199  Unlike PASPA, however, Section 10136 is a federal statute that passes the Northwest 
Austin test and is not in contravention of the doctrine of equal state sovereignty. 
 The statute explicitly states that Congress “finds that . . . radioactive waste creates 
potential risks and requires safe and  environmentally acceptable methods of disposal.”200  
Congress further determined that radioactive waste is “a national problem . . . created by the 
accumulation of (A) spent nuclear fuel from nuclear reactors; and (B) radioactive waste from (i) 
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel; (ii) activities related to medical research, diagnosis, and 
treatment; and (iii) other sources.”201  The problem is indeed serious and presents a troubling 
national issue.  The statute, however, still treats the forty-nine states that do not receive federal 
funding and the state of Nevada disparately.  Under Northwest Austin, this disparate treatment 
must be sufficiently related to the disposal of accumulated radioactive waste to be a 
constitutional exercise of congressional power.  
 Congress determined that Yucca Mountain, Nevada constituted the best site for high-
level nuclear waste disposal and thus funneled all future funds to the state after that 
                                                 
197 Id. 
198 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013). 
199 42 U.S.C. § 10136 (2006). 
200 42 U.S.C. § 10131 (2006). 
201 42 U.S.C. § 10131 (2006). 
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determination.202  Section 10136 provides an excellent example of a federal statute that departs 
from the principle of equal sovereignty, albeit in an insignificant manner and with perhaps 
undesired effects.203  Regardless of the other consequences of the statute’s disparate treatment 
beyond the scope of the distribution of federal funds, the statute singles out the state of Nevada 
for the receipt of federal funds, and only Nevada, after a specified date.204  The problem (targeted 
by the statute) of disposing of “high-level radioactive waste and such spent nuclear fuel” in a 
repository required a specific geographic location that would solve the problem of locating and 
establishing a nationally-funded high- level radioactive waste repository.205   
 Thus, the problem of disposing of high-level radioactive waste in a safe and responsible 
manner required locating a remote depository site.  The statute’s disparate treatment of states, 
through the limiting of federal funds to Nevada, is, therefore, sufficiently related to the problem 
addressed by the federal statute.  Finally, the distribution of federal funds to Nevada alone is 
sufficiently related to the federal government’s disparate treatment of states under Section 
10136.  Thus, if challenged, the statute would likely be upheld under the Northwest Austin test. 
 The application of the Northwest Austin test to the federal statutes above shows that the 
application of the framework  can be workable within the modern constitutional structure.  
PASPA’s limitations and disparate treatment of states violate the  principle of equal sovereignty 
because Congress’s disparate treatment of states under PASPA is not sufficiently related to the 
                                                 
202 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 5032(a), 101 Stat. 1330 (1987) (amending 
the earlier version of the same statute to limit federal funding for nuclear waste disposal to only the State of Nevada 
after determining Yucca Mountain was an acceptable nuclear waste repository).  This problem targeted by the 
statute is sufficiently related to the geographic peculiarities of the Yucca Mountain site, and would therefore pass the 
Northwest Austin test.  
203 42 U.S.C. § 10136 (2006). 
204 Id. at § 10136. 
205 Id. at § 10131. 
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problem of sports betting.206  In contrast, Section 10136 addresses the problem of locating and 
funding a nuclear waste repository and treats states disparately by funding only Nevada for that 
purpose.207  But the problem Congress targets by distributing federal funds unequally pursuant to 
the statute is sufficiently related to the statute’s geographically disparate coverage.208 
 The hypothetical application of the test above shows that unwarranted federal intrusions 
upon traditional areas of state sovereign authority are invalidated under the test.  On the other 
hand, federal statutes that address significant federal issues, and bear sufficient relationship to 
the disparate effects they have upon states, are protected and may be maintained under the 
Northwest Austin framework.209  This shows that a recognition of the states’ right to equal state 
sovereignty is both desirable and practical if the test remains the same as the one applied in 
Northwest Austin.  It most likely will not cause the unbridled “mischief” predicted by the Shelby 
County dissent in its actual application.210 
IV. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the equal state sovereignty doctrine is a valid constitutional doctrine based 
on centuries of case law and principles derived from America’s oldest documents.211   The right 
to equal sovereignty under the Constitution is recognized as an implied fundamental 
constitutional right, and this recognition is apparent from a reading of the Court’s Tenth 
Amendment cases.212  The Northwest Austin test—if applied in the context of alleged violations 
                                                 
206 Oral Argument at 22:03, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, (3d Cir. 2013) (Nos. 
13-1713, 13-1714, & 13-1715), available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordingsgt. 
207 42 U.S.C. § 10136 (2006). 
208 42 U.S.C. § 10136 (2006). 
209 Contra Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013). 
210 Id. 
211 See Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50 (1787). 
212 Brief for Appellants, supra note21, at *19 (“[T]he entire line of federalism decisions from New York in 1992 to 
Sebelius in 2012 makes clear that the Supreme Court is unwilling to trust the political process to protect 
constitutional federalism.”).  
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of the equal state sovereignty doctrine—will best curb an unwarranted and excessive expansion 
of the doctrine and provides an optimal level of judicial scrutiny for the constitutional problem it 
addresses. 
 The recognition and respect of the right to equal state sovereignty benefits both states and 
private citizens, for “fidelity to principles of federalism is not for the states alone to vindicate.”213  
The individual citizens’ liberties that flow from the principles of federalism provide the most 
compelling reason for the recognition of the equal state sovereignty doctrine.  Yet the 
complexities of modern technology and interstate—and indeed international—commerce require 
a balancing of the state and citizens’ rights of equal state sovereignty against the effective 
governance of the federal government.  
 The modern Court holds that individual liberties are best protected by maintaining the 
principles of federalism.  As the Court noted in Bond, these principles are not some abstract 
concept that protect the state as a political entity.214  The separation of powers between central 
and provincial governments provide layer upon layer of protection against the incursion of 
arbitrary power.215  The Court faces the difficult problem of balancing the needs of an 
interdependent federation of states and the rights and responsibilities of those states under the 
Constitution.  The Northwest Austin test can protect the rights of states while allowing 
reasonable disparate treatment of the states by the federal government when necessary. 
 The Comment argues that the Court must now explicitly hold that every state in the 
Union maintains the right to equal sovereignty and dignity, and that every citizen within a state 
may use that right as the basis for a challenge to federal action that violates the Constitution.  
                                                 
213 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011). 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 2365 (“[T]he dynamic between and among the branches is not the only object of the Constitution's concern. 
The structural principles secured by the separation of powers protect the individual as well.”). 
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More importantly, however, it must clarify the confines of this doctrine and explain that it is not 
limited—nor should it be—to Congress’s exercise of its remedial power under the Fifteenth 
Amendment.  This Comment concludes that the Northwest Austin test should be expressly 
adopted by the Court to aid lower courts in consistently and productively applying the principle 
of equal sovereignty in the future.  
